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CALIFORNIA WESTERN
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 31 SPRING 1995 NUMBER 2
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS:
PRIVATE CHOICE AND PROPOSITION 174
CYNTHIA BRIGHT*
[The concern] that [voucher programs including religious
schools subsidize religion is] a Red Herning.. The
Supreme Court has made it almost unquestionable that they
would support a scholarship program where the support is
given to the parents. Then, if the parents choose a religious
school, that's their First Amendment right.'
Bret Schundler, Mayor of Jersey City, New Jersey
Until the last decade, the Supreme Court has vigilantly guarded religious
liberty through its Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the area of religious
aid to education.2 Only in the last decade has a reversal of this trend
emerged, with the Court allowing greater government involvement in and aid
to religion and religious education. Two recent Supreme Court cases in
particular highlight this trend against the background of religion clauses
cases. This trend has spawned an increasing number of school voucher
programs, which often include religious schools.3 The recent popularity of
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. The author thanks Christopher M. Kelly for
his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Jay Romano, Plan for School Vouchers Seemed to Pick up Steam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, §
13NJ, at 1. Contrary to the implications of Mayor Schundler's statement, the constitutional right of a
parent to choose religious education for his or her children is a fundamental liberty right found in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not of the First Amendment. See Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 286 U.S. 510 (1925).
2. The trend to guard religious liberty through the separation of church and state has proceeded
through a long history starting with Everson v. Bd. of Educ. and proceeding up to Grand Rapids Sch.
Dist. v. Ball. E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying the Establishment Clause to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding
unconstitutional programs to gave aid to the "secular" side of religious education); Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (finding unconstitutional state-funded
programs that gave direct cash grants to religious schools and gave tuition reimbursements to parents);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (finding unconstitutional state-funded remedial education services
that included loaning public school equipment, materials, and teacher for use in religious school); Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (finding unconstitutional the state loaning of public school teachers to
religious school); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a
timeshare program funding public school teachers work in religious schools).
3. See Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) and Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). Witters and Zobrest built on the principles that lay
dormant in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). See infra notes 140-171 and accompanying text.
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Stephen Carter's book, The Culture of Disbelief, trades on a parallel
sentiment growing in the populace at large.4 Newt Gingrich's demands for
prayers in school and educational vouchers for religious education reflect this
trend as well.5 The persuasiveness of Professor Carter's criticism that
modem culture scorns religion as a "hobby," 6 however, should not lend
credibility to his legal argument that government should abandon its former
position of separation and neutrality towards religion and strike out in favor
of greater aid to religious education.7 While some government accommoda-
tion to religious practices is required by the Free Exercise Clause, govern-
ment aid to religious elementary and secondary education crosses the line
from accommodation into the realm of establishment because of the
combination of two key factors: the impressionable nature of young children,
and the pervasiveness of religious teachings in religious elementary and
secondary schools. Contrary to the opinion of Mayor Schundler, state funds
distributed as education vouchers to support religious elementary and
secondary schools constitute aid to religion tantamount to an establishment
of religion.
California's Proposition 174 was the latest and largest attempt to create
a voucher program. It offered the purest test for the popularity of a radical
voucher program because of its state-wide scope, its inclusion of private and
religious schools, and its lack of restrictions on voucher redeeming schools.8
Despite the overwhelming defeat of the initiative, however, voucher
proposals are more popular than ever.9 The most controversial elements of
Proposition 174 can be modified in ways to make voucher programs more
popular with voters, yet such proposals may still raise constitutional concerns
if they include religious schools as eligible voucher redeeming institutions.
Because political change and social reform in California often sets the pace
and scope of change across the nation, the resolution of the finer points of
school choice programs in California may influence legislation across the rest
of the country. The inclusion of religious schools in Proposition 174
indicates that the final decision between private school choice and public
school choice has yet to be made.
The foundering of public schools across the country has increased the
popularity of school choice programs that propose to send state and federal
aid to religious elementary and secondary schools, and creates a fertile
ground for Professor Carter's argument to take root. For example, the
concern over the failing school system in Jersey City led Mayor Schundler
4. STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993).
5. Religious News Service, Public Schools May Become Constitutional Battleground, STAR TRIB.:
MINNEAPOLIS / ST PAUL, Nov. 19, 1994, at 8E.
6. CARTER, supra note 4, at 23-43.
7. Id. at 105-15.
8. See infra notes 52-88 and accompanying text.
9. Ed Mendel, Though Vouchers Flunked, Focus on ReformaRemains, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Nov.
4, 1994, at A-I.
[Vol. 31
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to advocate a city-wide voucher program that included religious schools. 0
When critics raised concerns over the constitutionality of using state funds
for religious education, Mayor Schundler dismissed their concerns based on
his view of the current Establishment Clause jurisprudence allowing the
private choice of parents to insulate from constitutional scrutiny what was
previously considered state action."1 Such a program delegates a decision
to a private actor that the state itself may not make. The idea that the choice
of parents to send state money through vouchers to religious elementary and
secondary schools escapes the restrictions of the Establishment Clause is
misplaced and ill-founded. This argument errs in its belief that because
government funds secular education, government should and can constitution-
ally aid religious education at the elementary and secondary level, and
anything less is hostility towards religion. The view that the Establishment
Clause is hostile to religion misunderstands the very nature of the First
Amendment and would wrongly allow aid to flow to religious education.
Neither the separation of church and state nor the exclusion of government
aid to religious institutions is based on hostility towards religion. Unfortu-
nately, the current Supreme Court view of the Establishment Clause seems
likely to permit such aid by analyzing a system of school vouchers through
rose-tinted glasses that recast state legislation as neutral programs where
private individual choice sends aid to religious education. Under this type
of Establishment Clause analysis, courts will most likely approve school
vouchers programs that include aid to religious education.
This article will present an analysis under the Establishment Clause of
California Proposition 174 as the most popular and recent incarnation of a
state wide proposal that would have allowed government tax dollars to flow
to religious education under a school choice program. In doing so, Section
I will examine the arguments for and against this proposition. Section II will
then examine the current Establishment Clause doctrine governing aid to
religious elementary and secondary schools as embodied in Mueller v.
Allen, 12 Witters v. Washington Services for the Blind,'3 and Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District.'4 In Section III, the article will then
criticize this view of the Establishment Clause, and conclude that parental or
student choice in directing vouchers to religious education only shrouds a
thin veil over the flow of government aid to religious institutions as a
purposeful part of an educational reform package. The current approach to
the Establishment Clause reveals that the principle of private choice by a
parent or student allows a carefully drafted, neutral program to escape
Establishment Clause prohibitions. Under a system of limited government,
10. Jack Anderson & Michael Binstein, Jersey City: Laboratory for School Choice, WASH. POST,
Sept. 26, 1993, at C7.
11. Romano, supra note 1, at 1.
12. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
13. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
14. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
3
Bright: The Establishment Clause and School Vouchers: Private Choice and
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
196 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
state and federal governments may not enlist or empower private citizens to
do what the sovereign may not. This section examines the critique in current
literature espousing the view that a strong Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is hostile towards religion.'I The article concludes that religious liberty is
better protected when the government refrains from sending state funds to
religious education under the guise of parental choice.
School vouchers and the inclusion of religious schools in voucher
programs have increased in popularity as a potential educational reform to
remedy the conventional wisdom that the public school system is in a state
of disaster.' 6 The media grips our attention by calling the problems
plaguing our public schools a "crisis in education." This fear lives in our
state and national legislatures. Efforts across the country work to reform
elementary and secondary public schools in order to stem the tide of falling
test scores and rising costs. Everyone seems to have a finger to point at the
source of the problem, and proposals to reform public schools are prolif-
erating. One of the increasingly popular reform measures includes allowing
parents and students "school choice." Many pundits explain that the "buzz
word" for the 1990s in school reform proposals is "choice.' 7  Current
proposals for school choice fall into two broad categories: choice by public
school students within the public school system or choice by all students
between public and private schools. The school choice tuition voucher,
which includes private schools, completely or partially subsidizes a student's
choice to attend a private school. Under Proposition 174, money that
previously funded public education would have flowed to private schools,
including religious schools."8
15. CARTER, supra note 4, at 105, 115. See infra notes 212-19 and accompanying text,
16. Laura A. Locke & Steve Scott, Education in California: The Age of Turmoil and Hope, CAL,J., June 1993, at 7 [hereinafter Education in Calfornia].
17. Carol L. Ziegler & Nancy M. Lederman, School Vouchers: Are Urban Students Surrendering
Rights for Choice?, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813 (1992). "Choice" assumes that competition for students
and the tuition dollars they represent will drive schools to increase their responsiveness to parents and
abandon the bureaucratic infrastructure that plagues most public school systems. Two views of school
choice exist in the policy debates and literature: unlimited school choice and public school choice, See
id. at 813-14 & n.3 (drawing a distinction between programs limited to public school choice and programs
including private independent and religious schools despite the lack of strong distinction in much of the
popular discourse). The broader based school choice allows parents to choose to send children to private
schools and have the state subsidize tuition with funds that were previously allotted to the public school
system. The California voucher initiative, commonly known as Proposition 174, falls into this category.
The other type of school choice is public school choice where parents of children in the public school
system may choose to send their students to the public school of their choice. The range of options under
public school choice may vary but usually include a choice of public schools within the resident's schooldistrict. See generally id. (discussing public school choice, comparing voucher plans to public school
choice, and analyzing the affect of vouchers on the public school system).
18. This paper will use the term "religious schools" to refer to what many courts and commentators
in the literature have meant by "sectarian schools" in order to avoid charges of discrimination against
religion. See Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term "Sectarian, " 6J.L. & POL. 449 (1990). In an effort to indicate that the separation of church and state is not a glorified
academic euphemism to shroud hostility towards religion, I have chosen to use the term "religious
schools" in place of the term "sectarian schools" in order not to cast a negative shadow on religious
schools. Baer's conclusion mistakenly views the separation of church and state as based on the view of
religion as bigoted, parochial, and marginal, which prompted the Founders and members of the Court to
banish it from the public realm. Yet the Founders believed in the importance of religion, and it was its
4
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School choice proposals are becoming increasingly popular at the local,
state, and national level. In keeping with the theme of reducing federal
government controls, Republican members of Congress support vouchers for
education to attend private or public schools.' 9 President Clinton proposed
limited, public school choice as an option in his Goals 2000 package.2
Former President Bush proposed a nation-wide voucher program for public
and private school choice in his America 2000 bill 1.2  At the state level,
the Wisconsin legislature created a limited program of private school choice
for students from low-income families.' In 1992, a citizens group in
California proposed a school choice program, Proposition 174, which gained
enough signatures to qualify as a state-wide ballot initiative in a 1993 special
election. 3 Although Proposition 174 lost by a landslide margin of seventy-
thirty percent, the popularity of vouchers has not abated. 4 Proposition 174
merits special attention because the initiative proposed the largest and most
sweeping school choice program proposed to date and because California
often leads the nation in social change.
extreme importance that led them to place it beyond the hands of the legislature. See infra notes 212-19.
19. Religious News Service, supra note 5, at 8E.
20. President Clinton included a limited public school choice program as part of his initial education
package. As the Goals 2000 bill wound its way towards passage, a more extensive voucher proposal that
included private and religious schools was rejected by the Senate. Jeffrey L. Katz, Education: Senate
Passes Goals 2000; Bill Heads to Conference, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 332 (Feb. 12, 1994). In its final
form the Goals 2000 bill allowed localities to establish public school choice plans. Robert M. Wells,
Divisions: House Education Bill, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1246-49 (May 14, 1994).
21. U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, AMERICA 2000: AN EDUCATION STRATEGY 5-7 (1991).
22. Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1990). The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program began in 1990 as the first
private school voucher program in the country. The program allows eligible students to attend non-
sectarian, private schools in the city. The student's family must have an income equal to or less than 1.75
times the poverty level. The program requires that eligible students attended a public school the previous
year or were not enrolled in school. The total number of participants could not exceed one percent of the
Milwaukee Public School population. This one-percent limitation placed the level of participants at about
1,000 possible students. The program limited participating private schools based on several standards for
attendance, achievement, grade advancement, and parental involvement. Frank R. Kemerer et al.,
Vouchers and Private School Autonomy, 21 J.L. & EDUc. 601, 613, 621 (1992).
Proposition 174 differs from the Milwaukee Program in several important aspects. Most importantly
for this paper, the initiative included religious schools as voucher-redeeming schools. The initiative placed
no limits on eligible students in their total number or income level. The initiative in California would
have allowed vouchers for all five million students in public schools in its first year. In its second year,
the initiative would have given vouchers to students attending private schools. The initiative had more
lax standards governing which schools may qualify as vouch-redeeming schools. Proposition 174 also
lacked oversight and audit provisions to evaluate the performance of voucher-redeeming schools from year
to year. Id. at 614. Because of these distinctions, the conclusion of several authors that the litigation over
the Milwaukee Program represents the issues likely to arise in litigation over similar school choice
program is unlikely to be true for Proposition 174. Id. at 615. However, following any enactment of a
plan substantially similar to Proposition 174 litigation would likely arise over the exclusion of handicapped
students. Id. at 619.
23. Stanley Moss, School Vouchers-Will They Save or Destroy Public Education, CAL. J., June
1992, at 311. EXCEL, Excellence through Choice in Education League, petitioned for over 600,000
signatures to qualify to have the "Parental Choice in Education" Initiative, Proposition 174, listed on the
California ballot. Id.
24. Former Congressmen Debate California School Voucher Vote (National Public Radio Broadcast,
October 20, 1993) available in NEXIS, CMPGN Library, NPR File. [hereinafter Former Congressmen
Debate] (Statement of Mr. Weber).
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I. SCHOOL CHOICE UNDER PROPOSITION 174
Political and social changes that originate in California often influence
the rest of the nation.' The story of Proposition 174 provides an important
crucible to examine the pros and cons of school choice, and what happens
with these issues in California may become a watershed for similar state-wide
legislation in the rest of the country. Before considering the details of
Proposition 174, some background on the California public school system is
necessary. California has the largest public school system in the country.
Over 5.2 million students enroll in California's public school system." In
1992, California spent twenty-seven billion dollars to fund school levels K-
twelve,2' a total amount larger than any other state but a relative amount
placing California thirty-ninth in per pupil spending.' California suffers,
along with many states, from escalating education costs and unimpressive or
falling test scores.29 Increasing numbers of students have limited English
skills and speak another language at home only compounding learning
difficulties in the classroom. 30 This influx of students with limited English
skills puts additional strain on already scarce resources.3' Despite some im-
provements in the indicators,32 concerns over the quality of education
remain a central concern of political debate." Confidence in the public
schools system has continued to decline.' Because several funding
guarantees and tax restrictions constrain efforts to reform school financing
in California more than other states,3' Proposition 174 supposedly offered
25. Id.
26. MARCH FONG EU, SECRETARY OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET:
SPECIAL STATEWIDE ELECTION, Nov. 2, 1993, at32 (1993) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET];
Education in California, supra note 16. The Secretary of State prepares the ballot pamphlet for each
election. To prevent confusion, state initiatives are numbered consecutively since 1982, regardless of the
success of former measures.
27. Education in California, supra note 16, at 9. The $27 billion figure represents an increase of over100% since 1983. Per pupil spending has increased by two-thirds during the same time, Adjusted for
inflation, this increase is somewhat smaller, but it represents an increase of only 13 % over 1983 levels.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Former Congressmen Debate, supra note 24.
30. Id.
31. Education in California, supra note 16, at 8.
32. Since the 1980s drop-out rates have declined. Additionally more students are signing up for the
SAT and advanced placement tests. Id.
33. Former Congressmen Debate, supra note 24.
34. Education in California, supra note 16, at 7.
35. In 1988, California passed Proposition 98, which devotes at least forty percent of the state'sbudget to public schools including community colleges. Proposition 111 amended 98 to forbid more than
twenty-five percent of the state's funding for education to come from state property taxes. Together these
two initiatives create a funding minimum for public schools K-12 and community colleges. Proposition
13 limited the use of property taxes in funding education. Provisions of Proposition 174 ensure that
scholarship funds count towards the required minimum funding levels. Proposition 174 (b)(8) (Proposed
Amendment to California Constitution art. IX. § 17 (a)(1)) in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHILET, supra
note 26 [hereinafter Proposition 174]. Reprinted in Appendix. See also Senate Const. Amend. No. 30(1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) (Bill introduced on Jan. 6, 1992 to the California Senate that follows the language
of Proposition 174.); Assem. Const. Amend. 46 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) (1992) (Bill introduced on Feb.
[Vol. 31
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the chance to escape these problems and increase the quality of education by
creating competition among schools.
Critics of the public school system and proponents of Proposition 174
targeted the monopolistic, archaic, and inefficient nature of the public schools
which create large bureaucracies and fail to produce satisfying educational
results.36 Economists have often proposed to increase school competition,
and thereby education quality, through "school choice" or school vouch-
ers.37  A voucher system would allow parents to choose the schools their
children attend based on highest education standards and achievement records
of different schools. Forced to compete for funding, schools would then
stream-line wasteful bureaucracy and inefficient practices in order to attain
greater academic achievement out of each dollar spent. Proponents argue
that school choice would increase accountability to parents and educational
quality for students.38
Proponents of increased competition under the initiative compare public
and private schools to the United States Postal Service and Federal Express.
Proponents noted that the Postal Service was inefficient and unresponsive to
customer needs until independent courier firms invaded the market and
forced the Postal Service to compete by offering higher quality services. For
example, they pointed out how the Postal Service did not offer overnight
delivery until Federal Express and other mail courier systems did.39
Similarly, proponents argued, large, bureaucratic, inefficient public schools
would not offer greater academic quality in education until they are forced
to compete with private schools for tuition dollars. In the same way
competition forced the Postal Service to respond to customer desires for
faster mail service, competition among schools would force public schools
to offer better educational quality and raise academic standards or lose
funding to other schools, private or public. In response to increasing public
funding without corresponding improvements in academic standing, the
slogan for Proposition 174 said, "You're not spending too little on education;
you're getting too little in return. '" Proponents claimed the initiative
21, 1992 to the California Assembly tracking the language of Proposition 174.).
Teachers salaries also come under fire in the school funding debate. Critics point out that teacher's
salaries are ranked seventh in the nation, while the overall per pupil spending is ranked thirty-ninth. High
teacher salaries limit the resources remaining for educational programs. The president of the California
Teacher's Association, Del Weber, defends the gap noting that these comparative figures are deceptive
because California has the highest cost of living in the nation. Education in California, supra note 16,
at 9.
36. Laura A. Locke, The Issue of "Choice:" A Voucher Initiative Goes Before Voters, CAL. J., June
1993, at 13 [hereinafter A Voucher Initiative.]; Laura A. Locke, The Voucher Initiative: Breakthrough or
Break- Up for California Schools?, CAL. J., Oct. 1993, at 9, 10, 17-22 [hereinafter California Schools].
37. Critics blame the public schools for their lack of innovation and claimed that they behaved
essentially like monopolies. Moss, supra note 23, at 312. The source of the idea most likely originates
in the Wealth of Nations. Adam Smith proposed a voucher system for parents to buy educational services
for their children. Id.
38. A Voucher Initiative, supra note 36, at 13.
39. The Issue of "Choice" in Education, CAL. J. WKLY., May 31, 1993.
40. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 26, at 36.
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would have eliminated waste and mismanagement from bloated bureaucracy
by forcing public schools to become more competitive for student vouchers
and the tuition dollars they represent. t
Following this logic, the overall quality of education would improve.
Proponents argued that vouchers give the public schools incentives to
improve standards2 By allowing greater access for poorer families to
send their children to private schools, supporters said that vouchers would
have increased the fairness of the school system. 3 Vouchers would have
potentially offered a way for students to escape crime-ridden schools. '
Proponents also argued that the initiative would save the public school system
billions of dollars, both in the short and long term. 45  The theory was that
with many school-age children leaving the public school system, total costs
would decline because of the voucher's value of only one-half of the cost of
educating each pupil in the public school system.46 The analysis prepared
by the California Secretary of State's Office indicated that as each pupil left,
the state would spend $2,600 for the voucher and save $3,700 in education
costs, producing a net savings of $1,100 per student. When the migration
from the public schools stabilized after about five years, the state would save
$1 billion per year if thirty percent of students left the public school
system. 47
41. The initiative provided no provision for auditing the use of these funds. Opponents noted that
vouchers were virtually unrestricted and thus may have spawned fraud and waste. Id.
42. A Better Choice for Education, located in El Segundo, supported the initiative, Proponents of
Proposition 174 included William Bennett, U.S. Secretary of Education from 1985-1988 under former
President Reagan; H. Glenn Davis, Associate California State Superintendent of Public Instruction from
1970-1978; and Carmela Gamica, School Board Member, Palo Verde Unified School District, Id,
43. Locke, A Voucher Initiative, supra note 36, at 13-14.
44. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 26, at 36-37.
45. Id. at 36. Proponents offered a savings figure of $19 billion over eight years. These figures
depend on several unknown and unquantifiable variables, the most important of which is the number of
students leaving the public school system for private schools. Id. at 34. After five years, estimates
indicate that the number of students shifting to private schools would stabilize. Id. The net costs or
savings depends on the percentage shift of students from the public school system to private schools, The
percentage of students leaving ranges from ten to thirty-three percent. If only ten percent leave, the public
school system incurs costs of $800 million. If twenty percent shift, the school system breaks even. If
thirty-three percent leave, the public school system saves $1 billion. Id. at 35. These figure depend on
assuming that the voucher will remain at $2,600 and that the net savings of student leaving is $1,100.
It is assumed that schools save $3,700 for a pupil leaving. The most important uncertainty to highlight
is that exactly how many student might have left was a great unknown equivalent to "spinning an
educational wheel of fortune." California Schools, supra note 36, at 9, 14.
46. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 26, at 34. The numbers of students that could leave
in one year is, however, quite limited because of limited open spaces in private schools. Current studies
estimate 43,000 available spaces in California private schools. Election '93, CAL. J., Nov. 1, 1993, at
37. Even if new schools formed under the initiative, the lag time in start up might delay any significant
exodus from public schools-an occurrence the proponents of Proposition 174 seem to have overlooked
in their calculation of the potential savings generated by its passage.
47. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 26, at 35. Whether this was really possible was
uncertain because the numbers of students that would leave the public schools was speculative at best with
no research to back up the estimates. California Schools, supra note 36, at 14. The thirty-percent figure
represents the highest estimated students leaving the public schools. At a twenty percent migration level,
the state breaks even. If only ten percent leave, the state loses $800 million per year. Id. The estimated
number of students that would actually leave public school for private schools is not given. It is important
to note that in the five-year transition period, the state would incur additional costs because it would have
to fund scholarships used by students currently in private schools. Id.
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In pursuit of greater quality in education by competition among schools
for tuition dollars, the Excellence through Choice in Education League
(EXCEL) gathered signatures to qualify their initiative, Parental Choice in
Education, for a state-wide election ballot.' EXCEL did not receive the
requisite signatures to qualify the initiative for the 1992 election, but did so
shortly thereafter, and Governor Pete Wilson called a special election for
1993. 49  "Parental Choice in Education" was listed on the ballot as
Proposition 174.50 On election day in 1993, Proposition 174 resoundingly
lost by a seventy-to-thirty percentage vote.5 '
Proposition 174 offered an educational scholarship for every resident,
school-age child in California.52 Scholarships could have been redeemed
at any scholarship-redeeming school, which included public, private, and
religious schools that met minimal non-discrimination requirements.53 The
amount of the scholarship, estimated at $2,600, was guaranteed to at least
match fifty percent of the total amount of state and local government
spending per student for education during the preceding fiscal year.54 The
legislature could have set higher scholarship levels for different grade
levels.5 After one year, Proposition 174 would have required the Legisla-
ture to establish procedures to allow pubic schools to become independent
"voucher redeeming" schools. The initiative required state academic
testing, 56 but strictly limited any additional regulation of private schools and
"voucher redeeming" independent schools.57
48. EXCEL needed over 600,000 signatures to qualify the initiative for the state ballot. Moss, supra
note 23, at 311.
49. George Skelton, Capitol Journal: Wish List by Wilson Needs Aladdin's Lamp, L.A. TiMES, May
24, 1993, at A3.
50. Props Get Numbered, CAL. J. WKLY., Aug. 9, 1993.
51. Mendel, supra note 9, at Al.
52. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (a).
53. Id. This provision reads, "Empowerment of Parents: Granting of Scholarships. The State shall
annually provide a scholarship to every resident school-age child. Scholarships may be redeemed by the
child's parent at any scholarship-redeeming school. . . ." The requirements for voucher-redeeming
schools are set forth in section (b) and require that schools not discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity,
color, or national origin; not promote unlawful behavior or hatred of any group on the basis of race,




56. Id., subpart (a)(6).
57. Id., subpart (b)(4). This feature makes Proposition 174 distinctly unlike most private school
choice programs. See note 22, supra, on Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. Commentators often note
that following private school choice programs, regulation of the private schools will increase. Kemerer,
supra note 22, at 622-23. In fact, they suggest, "the best way to limit encroaching regulation is to curtail
the legislature's ability to legislate via constitutional amendment. . . ", which is precisely what Proposition
174 does. Id. at 622. Regulation of voucher redeeming schools is possible under the initiative, but very
difficult because of the three-fourths super-majority requirement. The possibility of increased regulation
may make participation in voucher program less appealing to private schools than it initially seems.
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The criticism of Proposition 174 proved formidable and prolific.58
Seven major education organizations opposed the initiative.59  Both
Democratic President Bill Clinton and Republican Governor Pete Wilson
opposed the initiative.' The fact that Proposition 174 would have been
enshrined in the California Constitution and would have required super-
majorities of three-fourths of the Legislature to change scared off even
expected conservative supporters." In a surprising move, and in contrast
to his anti-government rhetoric, even former President Reagan opposed the
initiative.62 Critics argued that Proposition 174 would not lead to any of
the improvements that proponents claimed. 63  Critics argued that the
comparison between Federal Express and private schools and the Postal
Service and public schools was more apt description of the status quo, not
the results of a voucher program.A
Out of all the criticism, five arguments were the most popular: (1) the
net result would cost tax payers and drain money from the public schools;
(2) benefits would only flow to the rich who could already afford private
school tuition; (3) the program allowed and subsidized discrimination; (4) the
program offered no academic standards; and (5) the program licensed the
break up of the public school system.
First, Proposition 174 would have drained essential money from the
public school system.6' Each voucher-scholarship used to fund a student to
go to private school would have immediately removed $2,600 from the
public school system. If the child did not return to public school, the
individual public school would have lost another $2,600, which represents
58. Proposition 174 faced bipartisan opposition. Opponents included President Clinton; Governor
Pete Wilson; Charity Webb, President of the California School Boards Association; Del Weber, President
of the California Teacher's Association; and Norman T. Allen, Chairman of AARP California State
Legislative Committee. A.G. Block, Election '93, CAL. J., Nov. 1, 1993, at 37 (noting opposition of
Clinton and Wilson); CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 26, at 37 (listing opposition of Webb,
Weber, and Allen).
59. A Voucher Initiative, supra note 36. Led by the Committee to Educate Aainst Vouchers,
opposition organizations included the California School Boards Association, California Teachers
Association, California Federation of Teachers, Association of California School Administrators,
California School Employees Association, Service Employees Association, and the California PTA. Id.
The opposition included negative endorsements from Governor Pete Wilson and President Clinton.
Election '93, CAL. J., Nov. 1993, at 37.
60. Id.
61. Albert Shanker, Where We Stand: Conservatives and Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1993, at
E7 (advertisement).
62. Robert D. Novak, Half-Hearted Fight for Choice, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1993, at A19.
63. Moss, supra note 23, at 312-13.
64. Richard Zeigler, Vouchers, CAL. J., Oct. 1993, at 10. The counter argument to the Postal
Service analogy noted that the Postal Service must take all classes of mail from priority to book rate,
whereas premium services only accept priority mail, for which they can charge premium rates. Although
the arrival of express couriers provided competition, they also drain away high end revenues. Similarly,
the public school system must take all students from the most intelligent to the most challenged, mentally
or physically. Private schools may screen out problem students that have poor English skills, behavioral
problems, weak study habits, or physical handicaps. Finally, the point is brought home by noting how
devastated the Postal Service would be if one half of the revenues generated by the 32 cent stamp went
to subsidize express courier services. Id.
65. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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the other half of the total funds that the school received for that student's
enrollment.66 This diversion of money shrinks the pool of available money
for neighborhood public schools. Opponents argued that when schools were
hit with the loss of funds from students leaving, the schools lacking resources
will become "defunct and unable in any practical sense to serve [their]
remaining students."67 Under the Postal Service analogy, the services the
Postal Service could afford to provide would be severely undercut if half of
the thirty-two cent stamp were suddenly diverted to subsidize Federal Ex-
press.6" In the long term, depending on the number of students who left the
public school system, the initiative might have generated net costs of up to
$800 million per year instead of saving the billions that proponents
claimed.6 9 In the short term, it was a certainty that costs would have been
higher until the number of students leaving the public school system
stabilized.7' In addition to costs incurred by students leaving the public
schools, proponents failed to consider the impact of funding scholarships for
students in private schools. Two years after adoption, students in private
schools would have been eligible for state-funded voucher-scholarships.
Providing vouchers for private school would have expanded the eligible
number of voucher students by ten percent.7" The additional cost of
funding scholarships for students attending private school would have raised
the short and long term cost regardless of how much money might have been
saved from students leaving the public schools.
Second, critics charged that Proposition 174 only served the interests of
the rich who already have children in private schools.72 Under the Postal
Service analogy, subsidizing Federal Express would provide cheaper high
end services for the wealthy while diverting money from the system designed
to serve everyone. '3 The California initiative would have allowed students
to subsidize their choice of private and parochial school. '4 Two years after
the enactment of the initiative, every student in a religious or private school
would have qualified for a voucher. According to critics, the measure would
have thus served as a reward for those well-off enough to afford private
school tuition in whole or in part but would not help less well-off parents
66. Moss, supra note 23, at 312-13.
67. Id.
68. Zeigler, supra note 64, at 6.
69. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
70. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 26, at 35.
71. SeeA Voucher Initiative, supra note 36, at 14 (reporting that 90% of school children in California
are in public schools).
72. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the greatest supporters were parents with
children in private school. Supporters trailed opposition in every other demographic group and across
party lines. Bill Stall, The Times Poll: Opposition to School Vouchers Rises Sharply, L.A. Times, Oct.
21, 1993, at BI.
73. Zeigler, supra note 64, at 6.
74. Former Congressmen Debate, supra note 24.
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because they would not be able to afford the tuition that the $2,600
scholarship did not cover.75
Third, critics accused Proposition 174 of sanctioning discrimination on
the basis of religion, gender, handicapped status, and poor educational skills.
While Proposition 174 prohibits voucher-redeeming schools from discriminat-
ing on the basis of race, ethnicity, color, or national origin,76 vouchers
could subsidize schools that discriminate on the basis of religion, gender,
handicapped status, test scores, and income.' Public schools, on the other
hand, must accept all students regardless of religion, gender, physical capa-
bility, intelligence, or wealth. Under the comparison to the Postal Service,
the public school system must accept and educate all classes and kinds of
students, like the Postal Service carries all classes, shapes, and sizes of mail,
whereas private schools accept only brightest, most well behaved, most
talented, students with good English skills and Federal Express sets its own
standards for what mail it accepts. According to opponents, taxpayers then
would have subsidized this discrimination in private schools without recourse
because of Proposition 174's restrictions on the ability of the legislature to
regulate private schools.78 Then, after a year, when public schools could
apply to become independent schools, greater numbers of students could be
subject to discrimination in independent schools and the same restrictions on
regulation of private schools would apply.
Fourth, Proposition 174 would have set academic standards neither for
which schools can receive vouchers nor for who may teach in them. In fact,
Proposition 174 would have limited regulation of the private schools in order
to provide maximum flexibility to establish school policy and curriculum.79
75. CALIFORNIA VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 26, at 37. Proponents respond that sixty-four percent
of California's private schools are willing to charge less than $2,600 in tuition. Id. at 36.
76. Proposition 174, subpart (b)(1), supra note 35, at 44.
77. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra, note 26, at 33, 36-37. While voucher redeeming schools
may not teach hatred of groups based on race, ethnicity, color, national origin, religion, or sex, schools
may receive vouchers despite any discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, sexual orientation,
handicapped status. Coupled with the strong mandate against abridging the flexibility of private schools
to pursue their own academic programs, this statutory omission created a strong argument that the
drafters intended to allow such schools to be included as voucher redeeming schools. Id.
78. A Voucher Initiative, supra note 36. See also infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
79. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (b)(4). The proposition explicitly gave private schools
freedom from regulation:
Private schools shall be accorded maximum flexibility to educate their students and shall be
free from unnecessary, burdensome, or onerous regulation. No regulation of private schools,
scholarship-redeeming or not, beyond that required by this section and that which applied to
private schools on October 1, 1991, shall be issued or enacted, unless approved by a three-
fourths vote of the Legislature or, alternatively, as to any regulation pertaining to health,
safety, or land use imposed by any county, city, district, or other subdivision of the State, a
majority vote of qualified electors within the affected jurisdiction.
Id. This provision set forth strong provisions to protect private schools freedom from regulation that
usually accompanies accepting state money. The prospect of invasive regulation of the private schools
including religious schools as to what is acceptable creates significant drawbacks to accepting state funds
for education. If you take Caesar's coin, you take Caesar's law. This concern, not mentioned by the
media or opposition, may be far more damaging in the long run than proponents ever imagined. It raises
significant entanglement concerns over the long-term. See infra notes 231-232 and accompanying text.
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Private schools and independent voucher-redeeming schools are not subject
to the battery of state regulations for the public schools system, and nothing
in Proposition 174 changed this. For example, private schools are not
required to have credentialed teachers, rather they may hire "anyone capable
of teaching."8 In addition, any future regulation of these schools would
have required a three-fourths super majority vote of the legislature. 8' The
super-majority requirement would have placed control of any future
regulation of schools in the hands of only eleven state senators, who would
then have a minority veto over any reform.' These lax controls also would
not have included any provisions for the state to audit private school use of
funds, which could produce widespread abuse, waste, and fraud.
Moreover, anyone with twenty-five potential students could have started up
a school and qualified for state funds.' When a witches' coven announced
it was considering opening a private school that would qualify for vouchers,
previously speculative fears that anyone could soon be teaching children in
approved schools supported by state funds became real.' With such a lack
of control, Proposition 174 provided little guidance or oversight to guarantee
improved educational results.
Finally, critics argued that Proposition 174 abandoned the public school
system by authorizing the breakup of the public schools. 6 This provision
of Proposition 174 may have been the most radical and controversial. After
one year, Proposition 174 would have directed the legislature to expeditiously
create means for public schools to become independent, "scholarship-
80. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 26, at 33.
81. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (b)(4).
82. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 26, at 37.
83. Id.
84. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (b)(3).
85. Dan Morain, School Voucher Campaign Zeros in on Swing Voters, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993
at AI; Former Congressmen Debate, supra note 24.
86. Proposition 174 included a section entitled "empowerment of teachers," which allowed the "break
up" of the public school system: "Conversion of Schools. Within one year after the people adopt this
section, the Legislature shall establish an expeditious process by which public schools may become
independent scholarship-redeeming schools. . . ." Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (c). Wide-
spread, state-wide, organized, public education as we know it today has only existed for the past 125
years. 2 GEORGE B. TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 796-801 (1984). While the first public
schools emerged in the twenty years following the ratification of the Constitution, these efforts remained
confined to large urban areas, such as New York City. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 645 (1971).
The majority of schools prior to that time had a close link to religion. TINDALL, supra, at 491. The
history of education on the nineteenth century is a protest against secular funds needed for religious
education. Much of this struggle takes on a pointed anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant nature, but the
education, however, retained a general Protestant religious and morality content. ROBERT T. MILLER &
RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT
617 (4th ed. 1992); TINDALL, supra, at 793.
Common school education is an American tradition that provides common ideals and experience.
A unique American feature is free public education available to all. California Schools, supra note 36,
at 10. The idea was born out of the need for educated citizens who would need to be educated on issues
of the day in order to participate in democratic government. Despite the room for parental choice in the
United States, enshrined in the Constitution since Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), state
accreditation standards may suffice to insure that common principles of that state are taught, e.g., U.S
history, civics, and the three R's. See Theodore Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress, and the
Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV., 1395, 1465 (1966).
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redeeming" schools and operate as private schools.' Given the strong
provisions that prevent the regulation of the private schools except by a
three-fourths majority vote of the legislature,"8 public schools could have
been released from the requirements that are currently in place, which would
leave no guarantees to insure any minimum quality of education.
Throughout all this criticism, most critiques focused on policy implica-
tions. Although the general counsel to the California general assembly
objected that Proposition 174 would violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, very few commentators mentioned constitutional concerns. 89
Voters may consequently accept a voucher proposal that addresses these
policy objections and still provides state funds directly to religious schools.
Public discontent with poor quality education did not dissipate with the defeat
of Proposition 174. Despite this defeat, California remains on the cusp
of education reform,9 and the popularity of school choice survived the
1993 election. 2  In fact, a Gallup poll revealed that fifty percent of
Americans support vouchers. 93 This high level of support for vouchers
indicates that different voucher plans may gain favor among voters where
Proposition 174 did not.
Several changes to Proposition 174 could make school choice far more
popular without removing the constitutional concerns. First, a plan that
allowed greater regulation of voucher-eligible schools would increase
accountability and allay public fears that taxpayers had no control over tax
dollars.94 Means-tested eligibility for students would help alleviate concerns
that the program was only designed to help the rich, yet maintain the ability
to increase fairness by allowing greater choice to students from families
without the resources to currently attend private schools. Disqualifying
schools which engage in unlawful discriminatory practices would also reduce
much of the broad opposition to this voucher plan. Creating minimum
academic and performance standards for eligible schools would have the
same effect as allowing greater regulation of schools, and would provide
greater assurances that the program would help raise the quality of education,
not merely create a new financing system with no results. Finally, a school
choice plan that did not authorize the break up of the public schools would
gain more support among parents, elected officials, and teachers associa-
tions.95 Any combination of these changes would mitigate the concerns
voiced in opposition to Proposition 174, yet they would not necessarily
87. Moss, supra note 23, at 313.
88. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (b)(4). See also supra note 79.
89. California Schools, supra note 36, at 11-12.
90. Stall, supra note 72, at B1.
91. Moss, supra note 23, at 313. Former Congressmen Debate, supra note 24.
92. See Former Congressmen Debate, supra note 24 (Former Rep. Vin Weber (R-Mn)).
93. David Smollar, Schools Poll Finds Support for Vouchers, L.A. TiMES, Feb. 13, 1992, at BI.
94. Id.
95. Stall, supra note 72, at BI.
[V/ol. 31
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prevent aid from flowing to religious schools. These changes would make
new legislation more popular, yet offer the same threat to religious liberty.
Such a new voucher proposal might well pass the policy resistance that
Proposition 174 met. Thus, the courts remain the final arbiter of whether
such a program runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution.
Until recently, the Supreme Court has vigilantly guarded religious liberty
by declaring unconstitutional laws that provide aid to religion that amount to
an establishment of religion." Among these cases are the religion education
cases. Aid to religious education is one of the most contentious Establish-
ment Clause issues. Modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence begins with
this issue,97 and school vouchers programs allowing public funds to flow to
religious schools return this unclear area of the law to the forefront of public
debate. The popularity of school choice programs that include private,
religious schools provides the vehicle for the chain of cases which allow
government financial aid to flow through a parent's or student's choice to
send state funds to religious education to gain greater prominence. Another
decision could establish and confirm an unfortunate trend and departure from
the traditional protections of the Establishment Clause.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
The current trend in Supreme Court cases involving indirect aid to
religion has weakened the strong protection once provided under the Lemon
test. 98 By strictly focusing on a private choice in a neutral program
analysis, the Court has allowed money to flow to religious institutions as the
secondary, indirect effect of legislation. This principle allows legislatures to
carefully craft legislation that sanctions and funds a private actor to do what
the Establishment Clause forbids the government to do.99 Proposition 174
would have most likely passed the test in its current spectral incarnation after
Mueller v. Allen," Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
96. E.g., Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying the Establishment Clause to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding
unconstitutional programs to give aid to the "secular" side of religious education); Committee for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (finding unconstitutional state-funded
programs that gave direct cash grants to religious schools and gave tuition reimbursements to parents);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (finding unconstitutional state-funded remedial education services
that included loaning public school equipment, materials, and teacher for use in religious school); Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (finding unconstitutional the state loaning of public school teachers to
religious schools); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a
timeshare program funding public school teachers work in religious schools).
97. Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
98. Lemon 403 U.S. at 612-13. The test requires that legislation must (1) have a secular purpose,
(2) have a principle or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not foster an
excessive entanglement with religion. Id.
99. For a description of the trends in aid to education cases from Everson to Witters see David
Futterman, Note, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politics of Public Aid to Private
Parochial Schools, 81 GEO. L.J. 711, 715-25 (1993)
100. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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Blind,10 and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.°2 The cumu-
lative effect of these cases indicates that the Court will find a legislature does
not establish religion when the funds the state distributes under a general
program which makes no reference to religion are directed to religious
institutions by the choice of private actors. Under this formalistic analysis,
Proposition 174 would have passed scrutiny under the Establishment Clause.
A. California State Constitutional Provisions
The Supreme Court's weak interpretation of the Religion Clauses has led
at least one commentator to call it malpractice for any attorney to fail to
plead state constitutional provisions in additional to federal constitutional
claims because state provisions are the only ones providing forceful
protection of religious liberty. 3 For example, the guarantees of the
California Religion Clauses"° extend further than the federal Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses by prohibiting any preference expressed by the
legislature."0 5 This additional protection derives from the language in the
first clause of the section prohibiting a preference for religion, not from the
California's Establishment Clause itself. Provisions in the California
Constitution also prohibit public funds from supporting private schools,
religious or non-religious. 6 Several other provisions of the California
Constitution" create stronger prohibitions than the federal Establishment
Clause against the flow of public funds to religious institutions." 8 The
California Constitution prohibits the use of public aid for sectarian purpos-
es"° and further prohibits the appropriation of public funds for sectarian
schools."0 Together these provisions prohibit appropriation or payment of
public funds to support religious schools and prevent any official involvement
that has the direct, immediate, and substantial effect of promoting religious
purposes. These provisions, which would normally provide greater religious
101. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
102. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
103. Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis of Religious Liberty, 60 CEO, WASH. L.
REV. 841, 854 (1992) [hereinafter Summary and Synthesis].
104. CAL. CONsT. art. I, §4. "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or
preference are guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The Legislature shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. . . ." Id.
105. Woodland Hills Homeowners Org. v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 266 Cal. Rptr.
767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Feminist Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Philibosian, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984). The legislature may not express a preference for the views of a religious organization.
Id. A law expressing a denominational preference is treated as suspect and subjected to strict scrutiny
under the Lemon test. Woodland Hills, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
106. See CAL. CONST., art. IX, §8 and art. XVI, §5. See also 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 64, at *20 (Cal.
1981).
107. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; CAL. CONsr. art. IX, § 8.
108. Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
109. CAL. CONsr. art. XVI, § 5.
110. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
[Vol. 31
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 31 [1994], No. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol31/iss2/2
1995] THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS 209
freedoms to the citizens of California, would not have provided any impedi-
ment to Proposition 174 because the initiative stipulated repeal of conflicting
provisions of the California Constitution to allow for full implementa-
tion."' Accordingly, Proposition 174 would have overridden the Califor-
nia Establishment Clause and enshrined aid to religious education in the
California State Constitution."12  Therefore, the only safeguards to protect
religious liberty that would have had any effect on Proposition 174 are
federal Constitutional guarantees, namely the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.
B. The Federal Constitutional Provisions
While the Court has repeatedly rejected the principle that "any program
which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation' violates
the Establishment Clause,""' 3 it has recognized the close and influential
relationship between religious institutions and elementary and secondary
schools run by these institutions raises Establishment Clause concerns when
governmental aid reaches these institutions." 4  The Court has previously
held that aid to religious schools cannot be viewed separately or differently
from aid to religion because religious schools are "pervasively sectari-
an."H5 Justice Douglas has written that the propagation of religious faith
forms the raison d'etre of religious schools, where the parish schools
consume forty to sixty-five percent of parish budgets. 116 Religious indoc-
trination forms an essential part of the curricula at religious schools, and the
religious mission of religious institutions permeates every aspect of
education, creating an atmosphere where "secular and religious education are
so inextricably intertwined, that substantial aid to the sectarian school
enterprise as a whole ... amounts to a forbidden establishment of reli-
gion.""' The Court should always be careful to scrutinize any program
that allows tax dollars to flow to religious education in order to insure that
111. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (a)(4). For the California Constitution Establishment
Clause see CAL. CONST, art I, § 4. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
112. See 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 64 (Cal. 1981). Douglas Laycock called it malpractice to plead only
federal constitutional claims under the Religion Clauses after Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990). Summary and Synthesis, supra note 103, at 854. While he focused on the Free Exercise
Clause in his article, the same argument applies to Establishment Clause claims because state guarantees
or religious liberty are often more expansive than the federal clauses.
113. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742
(1973)). See also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993) (repeating the
principle that religious institutions may constitutionally receive aid if the financial benefit is sufficiently
attenuated under a broad program not distributing benefits with reference to religion).
114. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975).
115. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971). See supra note 18 (concerning the use of the
word "sectarian").
116. Id. at 628 (Douglas, J., concurring).
117. Committee for the Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 652 (1980)(quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975)).
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state funds do not flow to benefit religious education and thereby endanger
religious liberty.
The first clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion . ... "Is In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court made the
Establishment Clause applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 9 Analysis under the Establishment Clause
must begin with consideration of the cumulative tests and criteria developed
by the Court over the years." The myriad cases that followed Everson
over the next twenty-five years focused on the purpose and effects of state
legislation on religion. These cases culminated in the Court's establishing
the tri-partite test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.'2 1 In the twenty years
after Lemon, the test has been severely criticized for its lack of guidance, and
the results of the Lemon test have been sharply criticized in the aid to
religious education cases," but it has yet to formally overruled or
abandoned. Under the Lemon test, a statute must have a secular legislative
purpose, must have a principle or primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and must not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion."z In aid to education cases, the shape and strength of the Lemon
test depends largely upon the degree of review under the primary effects test.
The former strength of this test has been mitigated by the recently formalistic
reading of the second element of the Lemon test. While current cases cite
Lemon and no longer proceed through an analysis prong-by-prong, such an
118. U.S. CONST., amend I, cl. 1.
119. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Murdock v. Pennsylvania makes reference to the fact that the Fourteenth
Amendment made the First Amendment applicable to the states. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
108 (1943). This case is not usually cited as authority to support the incorporation of the protections of
Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment because it focuses on the freedom of the press and
on the free exercise of religion. Id. at 117.
120. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
121. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The future of Lemon is uncertain. Justice O'Connor prefers an
endorsement test. Justice Kennedy prefers a coercion test. Still the Court has not overruled Lemon
formally nor abandoned it. Thus, even in its beleaguered form, it remains the relevant framework for this
analysis. Professor Lupu points out, however, that even with in this framework different principles are
emerging in different Establishment Clause contexts. Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 743, 767 (1992).
122. The most scathing criticism of the Lemon test flows from Justice Scalia's pen in Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Morichee Union Free School District: The test lurks as a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried. Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school
attorneys...." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2149 (1993)(Scalia, J., concurring). OtherJustices have criticized or outright proposed the abandonment of the Lemon
test. E.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (,Vhite, J., dissenting); Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610, 640 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
91, 108-12 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v, Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). Religion Clauses scholars have also cnticized the
separationist views enshrined in the Lemon test. Professor Steven Carter's criticism accurately reflects
much popular sentiment and distrust of religious motivation, but his analysis of history fails to assess
important principles in the Establishment Clause. His criticism of the Court's insensitivity to religion
more aptly fits the Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence culminating in the opinions in Smith and Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). Laycock, supra note 99, at 846-51.
123. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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analysis illuminates how easily Proposition 174 could have slipped through
the test in its current form.
C. The Lemon Test
1. Secular or Civil Purpose
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that a law have a valid secular
purpose. While the stated purpose of the law must not be a sham, 24 courts
are generally reluctant to look beyond the stated purpose of a statute and
attribute unconstitutional motives to a legislature when the text of a statute
offers a facially valid purpose. Although the Court has critically examined
legislative motives in enacting measures that sponsor prayer or teaching of
religion in the public schools and found that the legislature was trying to
endorse or disapprove of religion,"z the Court has never invalidated a
general welfare program of aid to education on grounds that the legislature
intended to aid religious schools.
In the realm of aid to education, the Court has upheld legislative
purposes that aim to improve the quality of education 26 and to help parents
defray the costs of education. 27 In Mueller, the Court explained that
a State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by
parents-regardless of the type of schools their children attend-evidences
a purpose that is both secular and understandable. . . . "The State
has ... a legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest quality
for all children within its boundaries, whatever school their parents have
chosen for them."' 2
In Lemon, the Court found that "A State always has a legitimate concern for
maintaining minimum standards in all schools it allows to operate."' 29
Thus, to pass constitutional muster, the initiative must have simply alleged
a valid purpose to improve the quality of education. 3 '
124. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring).
125. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594 (invalidating the Louisiana Act requiring equal teaching time
between evolution and Creationism Science because it was an attempt by the legislature to have religion
taught in the public schools); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55-56 (rejecting a moment of silence statute as an
attempt to create state-sponsored prayer in public schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)
(rejecting Kentucky's stated secular purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on public school walls
as a preeminent religious purpose).
126. Lemon, 403, U.S. at 613.
127. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
128. Id. (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
129. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
130. Richard C. Mason, School Choice and the Establishment Clause: Theories of "Constitutional
Legal Cause," 96 DICK. L. REv. 629, 632 (1992).
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Proposition 174 explicitly set forth six secular, educational purposes, 3,
which focused on improving the quality of education available to all
children. 32 The Proposition stated its purpose as follows:
The people of California, desiring to improve the quality of education
available to all children, adopt this section to:
(1) enable parents to determine which schools best meet their children's
needs;(2) empower parents to send their children to such schools;(3) establish academic accountability based on national standards;(4) reduce bureaucracy so that more educational dollars reach the
classroom;(5) provide greater opportunities for teachers; and(6) mobilize the private sector to help accommodate our burgeoning
school-age population.'
These six elements detail specific goals that derive from the general purpose
of improving the quality of education in California. These stated goals
provide sufficient evidence of a legitimate legislative purpose for the
requirement of the Lemon test. Similar to the approved purposes in Mueller
and Lemon, the goals of Proposition 174 to assist all parents under subsec-
tions (1) and (2) would have provided a legitimate purpose. The other goals
under subsections (3) through (6) would have provided additional legitimate
state purposes for the initiative. Thus, Proposition 174 would have cleared
the first prong of the Lemon test.
2. A Primary Effect that Neither Advances nor Inhibits Religion
Under this part of the test in religious school aid cases, the Court
considers several factors in determining whether aid advances or inhibits
religion to the danger of religious liberty: the age of children in the
institution, t"' the "substantiality" of the aid to the religious school, 135 the
broadness of the classification, 136 and the "directness" of the way the aid
reaches a religious school. 37  The younger the children in the institution
receiving aid, the more substantial the aid, the more directed the classifica-
131. Proposition 174, supra note 35.
132. Id., preamble.
133. Id., purpose.
134. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
135. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986).
136. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
137. Id. Several commentators include another factor in this area of the law. Richard Mason
indicates that the Court also considers "whether the law as a whole give the appearance that the state is
'endorsing' religion." Mason, supra note 130, at 630. Mason relies on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984), for the support of this theory. I believe that Lynch is not a proper "similar case" to use to
examine vouchers programs in the aid to religious education cases because it is a public forum case. The
endorsement aspect of Lynch is no doubt important to a complete evaluation, but more as an independent
alternative test than as an element of three traditional effects analysis of Lemon.
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tion at religion, and the more direct the government aid to the school, the
more likely the program will violate the Establishment Clause. Traditionally,
religious schools were considered to be so "pervasively sectarian" that no aid
could survive an Establishment Clause challenge if it supported the religious
mission of the religious institution.'38 Despite the pervasive religious
environment of religious elementary and secondary schools, more recent
cases have allowed aid to flow to religious schools in certain circumstances
when a parent or student directs state-funded aid to the religious institution
instead of the state sending the aid directly. Chief Justice Rehnquist best
summarized this view of the Establishment Clause in Zobrest when he wrote
"government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of
citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an
Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also
receive an attenuated financial benefit."' Despite previous cases to the
contrary,'4° the most important factor has become the directness of the aid.
The Court's focus on the directness of the aid encapsulated in the use of
the language of the school choice in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
started with the Court's opinion in Mueller v. Allen and had its most recent
incarnation in Zobrest, which mainly relied on the private choice within a
neutral, non-religious program analysis. The Court in Mueller emphasized
several factors in deciding a law did not have a primary effect that advanced
religion. First, the legislature has broad discretion in establishing any system
of deductions in its Tax Code.14' Second, and most importantly for the
Court, all parents were included in the program, not just parents of children
in religious schools, indicating the primary, secular effect of the statute. 142
This point formed the basis for how the Court distinguished the similar fact
pattern in Nyquist. Proposition 174 shared with the plan in Mueller the
feature the Court used to distinguish the plan in Mueller from the one
rejected in Nyquist: the benefit from the aid was not limited to parents of
private, religious education. 43  Third, government aid reached religious
schools "only as the result of numerous private choices of individual parents
of school age children."'" According to the Court, these distinctions
provided enough room to carefully waltz around previous cases involving the
"direct" transmission of state funds to religious schools.145
Mueller departed from previous line of cases that recognized the
transparency and formalism of this analysis. What was forbidden by the
138. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,366 (1975)); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1975).
139. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993).
140. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781(1973)(noting that directness of aid is only one of several factors to review).
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Establishment Clause in Wolman and Nyquist was allowed in Mueller, namely
aid to religious schools that subsidized education, and not non-educational
services. 46 Mueller also eliminated any serious effects analysis by reject-
ing a statistical analysis of how much aid in a general program actually
flowed to religious schools. 47 In Mueller, the Court upheld a Minnesota
law allowing taxpayers to deduct certain education expenses from gross
income in computing state income tax despite the statistical evidence that
ninety-six percent of the aid would reimburse parents expenses from religious
schools .148 The Court was satisfied that any unequal benefits to religious
schools were mitigated by the equal benefit to the state of reducing the
burdens on the public school system. 49 This comparison departed from
prior cases because it looked to an "offsetting" effect on public schools as
if it would somehow erase the effect of sending state funds to religious
schools. (The parallel to Proposition 174 is quite striking. The proponents
of Proposition 174 focused on the benefit to public schools system in reduced
costs and burdens on public schools. °) Additionally, the Court refused
to ground the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on varying annual
reports, leaving the law in a state of continual uncertainty. The significance
of this rejection cannot be overstated, because, in Mueller, ninety-six percent
of the eligible beneficiaries of the Minnesota tax deduction were parents with
children in religious schools.' If the private choice analysis insulated the
Minnesota legislature's tax deduction in Mueller from having a primary effect
to aid religion, then the primacy of that analysis swallows whole the
importance of any other relevant factor. By making this simple argument,
any court reviewing this legislation can drive Proposition 174 through the
holes in the effects prong of Lemon test ripped open by Mueller.
Any remaining doubts the Court's erosion of the protections of the
Establishment Clause through the use of the private choice by parents or
students to direct funds to religious use was swept away by Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind.'52 The Court in Witters
used the private choice reasoning of Mueller to reject an Establishment
Clause challenge to a Washington State program assisting the blind when a
blind person sought to use the money at a private Christian college in order
to become a pastor.'53 Although Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
did not cite Mueller, five Justices noted the parallel reasoning and cited
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 405 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 402.
150. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLEr, supra note 26, at 35-36 (outlining potential reduced
outlays for school budgets, capital, and administrative costs).
151. Mueller, 463 U.S. 400-01.
152. 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986); Futterman, supra note 99, at 725.
153. Witters, 474 U.S. at 481. Justices Powell and O'Connor in independent concurring opinions
both recognized and cited the applicability of Mueller. Id. at 490-91, 493.
[Vol. 31
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Mueller in separate concurring opinions. 54 In examining the Washington
State program under the effects test, Justice Marshall set forth three reasons
the program did not create a primary effect of advancing religion. First, the
aid under the Washington program flowing to the religious school ultimately
did so as the result of the "genuinely independent and private choices of the
aid recipients."' 55 This element of Witters tracks the third element of the
majority opinion in Mueller.'56 Second, the program to aid the blind
created no financial incentive to undertake a religious education or attend a
religious school.'" Third, the Court focused on the facts that nothing in
the record revealed that a significant portion of the aid went to religious
institutions. 58
One critical difference that could have been used to distinguish between
Witters and Proposition 174 is that aid in Witters went to a student at a
university-not elementary or secondary schools. This distinction had
previously provided a dividing line between acceptable aid and unacceptable
aid,' s9 but it no longer appears relevant to the Court. Zobrest presented the
issue of whether the distinction that Witters involved aid to a university
instead of a elementary or secondary school outweighed the importance of
the private individual choice in directing aid to the religious institution; it
does not.
In Zobrest, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the
use of state funds to pay for a sign interpreter for a deaf student attending a
private religious school." The Court explicitly relied on the principle that
the state funds sent to religious schools were part of a general program
distributing funds neutrally to any child without regard to any religious
affiliation of the school the student attends. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist followed the reasoning in Witters and Mueller that the
private choice of the parents cannot be attributed to state decision making and
thus the use of program funds that indirectly aid a religious institution did not
offend the Establishment Clause.' Chief Justice Rehnquist made no
mention of the amount of aid that would flow to religion, rather he
emphasized how the program was available without regard to the religious
or private nature of the institution benefitted, and thereby created no financial
incentive for students to choose religious over non-religious education. 62
154. Id. at 490-91, 493 (concurring opinions of Justice White, of Justice Powell as joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, and of Justice O'Connor).
155. Id. at 488.
156. The third argument the Court set forth under the primary effects prong was that public funds
become "available only as a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school age
children." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399. In Witters, this analysis of private choice becomes the Court's
leading argument under the primary effect's prong. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
157. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
158. Id. at 488.
159. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
160. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993).
161. Id. at 2467-68. In fact, the Court explicitly cited Mueller for this point. Id. at 2467.
162. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
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The opinion ignored the distinction between university and elementary and
secondary education. Thus, after Zobrest, the Court allows aid to flow to
religious education regardless of the age of the children, the size of the pro-
gram, or the substantiality of aid to the school-the only factor is the degree
of directness.
Several principles arise out of Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest which allow
programs to provide indirect aid to religious schools without violating the
effect prong of the Lemon test. Aid does not violate the Establishment
Clause when the state (1) makes a direct payment to parents or students, who
then remit the aid to the school of their choice, religious or not; 6' (2)
creates no incentive to attend a religious institution instead of secular
ones;'" and (3) makes benefits available to all children without regard to
a religious institution receiving benefits.'65 An analysis of these provisions
shows that Proposition 174 would have survived a constitutional attack under
the Establishment Clause. First, Proposition 174 was a broad based program
that includes all school-age children currently enrolled in the public schools.
After two years, when children attending private and religious schools are
included in the scholarship program, the initiative will include all school age
children. 66 At every point, the initiative neither categorized students nor
distributed aid with reference to religion, and after Mueller, Witters, and
Zobrest, this fact provides strong evidence of a secular primary effect.
Second, under the Court's Zobrest and Witters analysis, Proposition 174
did not create an incentive for students or parents to choose a religious
school. The scholarship amount remains at half the cost of educating a
student in the public school system, regardless of student choosing a religious
or non-religious school. 67 The scholarship under Proposition 174 does no
more or less than the program in Witters, "It creates no financial incentive
for students to undertake sectarian education. It does not create greater or
broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid to religious education, nor
are the full benefits of the program limited . .. to students at sectarian
institutions."' 68 Under the Court's logic, because Proposition 174 would
have offered public school students the same amount of money to go to other
public schools; newly formed schools; private, non-religious schools; or
religious schools, theprimary effect does not advance religion. Furthermore,
any court could now emphasize how the additional purposes of Proposition
174 to offer greater choice to parents, greater accountability to parents, and
greater opportunity for teachers all would have served to expand the full
163. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467; Witters, 474 U.S. at 488; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
164. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
165. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467; Witters, 474 U.S. at 487; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398.
166. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (a)(5).
167. See id., subpart (a)(1) (assigning value to the voucher based on one-half the average amount of
state and local spending per pupil-not determined by the type of school at which the voucher would be
used).
168. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
[Vol. 31216
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benefits of the initiative beyond the students enrolled in religious schools,
consequently taking the emphasis off religious schools and providing strong
evidence under this analysis of a secular primary effect to improve education.
Third and perhaps most important, the drafters of Proposition 174
carefully composed its language to take advantage of the evolving view that
the independent choices of a parent would insulate the state from any
successful challenge under the Establishment Clause. The section "empower-
ing parents" provides that parents are free to choose any scholarship
redeeming school, and "such selection shall not constitute a decision or act
of the State or any of its subdivisions."69 This language tracks the analysis
set forth in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest: when the state enacts a general
program for a legitimate purpose to increase the quality of education and a
parent independently and privately chooses where to spend the scholarship,
the flow of state money to religious education is the result of the parent's
choice, not state action.170 Thus a court could find that Proposition 174's
inclusion of religious schools does not constitute unconstitutional state action,
rather it facilitates parental choice.
Under this private choice doctrine, there still remains some ground to
argue that Proposition 174 violates the Establishment Clause, but these
arguments will most likely not survive the force of the private choice analysis
to immunize neutral programs from Constitutional attack when a private actor
remits state funds to religious institutions. The strongest argument that
Proposition 174 violates the Establishment Clause follows the reasoning in
School District of Grand Rapids School District v. Ball.'71 In Grand
Rapids, the Court found the program in question provided in-kind benefits
to religious schools indistinguishable from a direct cash grant because the
secular and religious education missions of religious elementary and
secondary schools were so intertwined that aid relieved the schools of
otherwise necessary costs involved with religious education. 7 Under the
same analysis, vouchers would give aid indirectly to the schools and provide
them with a subsidy in performing their educational function and thus violate
the Establishment Clause. Yet Zobrest gravely weakened the strength and
authority of the reasoning in Grand Rapids. Relying on the private choice
analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the subsidy argument when it was
made against the handicapped program which provided the interpreter in the
religious school because the primary benefit went to the student who
incidentally chose a religious school.'73 The Court does not look at the
169. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (a)(4) (emphasis added).
170. See supra notes 141-165 and accompanying text.
171. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
172. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617;
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 652 (1980). See supra notes
114-117 and accompanying text.
173. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2468-69 (1993).
25
Bright: The Establishment Clause and School Vouchers: Private Choice and
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW[
effect on religion, but rather on the child. 74 This is the same shift made
in Mueller where the benefit to public education "offset" any religious effect.
It is important to recognize that the Court was not limited to this distinc-
tion-there were other possible factual differences to distinguish between the
services provided to handicapped individuals in Witters and Zobrest and the
general, remedial educational services provided to supplement education in
Grand Rapids. These distinctions, however, were not mentioned in either
case. Regardless of whether the money might reduce education costs or not,
the question of the effect of the money never arises because, under the
Zobrest logic, the government is not sending the funds to religious schools,
the parents are. Given the private choice analysis used in Zobrest to distin-
guish Grand Rapids," any argument that Proposition 174 violates the
Establishment Clause based on Grand Rapids and the factual similarities of
the nature of the aid to Proposition 174 would fall victim to the choice
analysis adopted in Mueller,'76 endorsed implicitly in Witters,'77 and
affirmed in Zobrest."
A second possible way to distinguish Zobrest would rest on other cases
where the Court has previously indicated that the amount of the aid flowing
to religious institutions can be an influential factor as to whether a program
created an unacceptable establishment of religion. In Witters, the Court
relied on the fact that nothing indicated that a significant portion of the
program's funding would go to support religious schools.'79 Thus, in
addition to the aforementioned factors, the program did not create a danger
that it violated the Establishment Clause because the money that flowed to
religious schools was inconsequential. Whether or not Proposition 174 may
have met this requirement could have been based on careful factual and
statistical analysis, yet such statistical evaluations were rejected by the Court
in Mueller as part of the primary effects test. 8 ' The Court's reasons for
why it rejected statistical analysis are relevant to an evaluation of Proposition
174. First, the Court noted that parochial education has secular benefits in
that it provides an alternative to the public schools and creates "wholesome
competition,"'' which is exactly what Proposition 174 explicitly set out to
do. Furthermore, the amount of aid to the religious institution analysis was
not repeated in Zobrest. Chief Justice Rehnquist carefully mentioned three
significant factors of Witters, but subtly changed the amount of aid argument
174. This position looks at the "primary" effect as only extending as far as the first recipient of the
funds, not the aggregate primary effect. This focus on the first recipient departs from earlier Court cases
that focused on the aggregate primary effect of the aid. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774-81.
175. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468-69 (essentially finding attenuated financial benefit attributable to
private choices).
176. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983).
177. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986)
178. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
179. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
180. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401-02.
181. Id. at 402.
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made by Justice Marshall into a concern over whether or not the program
makes benefits available without reference to the religious or private nature
of the institutions benefitted.1 2 The cumulative force of Mueller and the
change by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Zobrest rob of any efficacy the potential
argument that Proposition 174 may give a substantial amount of aid to
religion.
A third potential argument against the constitutionality of the initiative
still available under the Establishment Clause as tempered by Zobrest follows
the advice that "Deep Throat" told Woodward and Bernstein: "Follow the
money." Opponents have room to argue that the initiative would have
directly given aid to religion because the state retains possession of the
voucher funds and gives the money directly to religious schools.I"3 At first
glance, the initiative explicitly disavows that the selection of a religious
institution can be attributed to the state. It reads:
Scholarships provided here under are grants of aid to children through their
parents and not to the schools in which the children are enrolled.... The
parent shall be free to choose any scholarship-redeeming school, and such
selection shall not constitute a decision or act of the State or any of its
subdivisions.. .. "
A court resting on this section for proof that there is no state action ignores
the advice of Ruth Bader-Ginsburg on statutory interpretation in her
confirmation hearings, "Read, and then read on."'" A careful reading of
the mechanics of the next section of Proposition 174 reveals that the voucher
or scholarship represents money that never goes to the parent. The money
remains in the control and possession of the state at all times until it is
disbursed to the school.'86 Subsection seven under the Empowerment of
Schools section directs the state:
After the parent designates the enrolling school, the State shall disburse the
student's scholarship funds, excepting funds held in trust pursuant to
paragraph (3) of subdivision (a), in equal amounts monthly, directly to the
school for credit to the parent's account. Monthly disbursals shall occur
within 30 days of receipt of the school's statement of current enroll-
ment.'s"
The parent directs the payment and the state makes the payment. Another
section subtly reveals the same mechanics: if a student attends a private
school where the tuition is less than the amount of the voucher, $2,600, the
182. Compare Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467 with Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
183. Proposition 174, supra note 35, at subpart (b)(7).
184. Id., subpart (a)(4).
185. The MacNeil /Lehrer News Hour (Educational Broadcasting & GWETA Broadcast, July 20,
1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
186. Proposition 174, supra note 35, at subpart (a)(4).
187. Id., subpart (b)(7) (emphasis added).
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surplus remains in trust by the state for the students to use at a later time.
If the credit is not used by the time of graduation, the student may spend the
credit at any college or university meeting the standards for voucher
redeeming schools in the state of California.' The student could use the
remaining funds to pay tuition at a religious university. Despite the technical
direct payment to schools, the state may still rely on the magical immuniza-
tion of the parental choice that sent the money to the religious institution to
cut the chain of state action. Parental and student choice saved the plans in
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest; it would have most likely saved Proposition
174.189
3. Excessive Entanglement
The strength of the entanglement prong has waned in the recent cases
that apply the Lemon test. 190 In assessing the nature of entanglement, the
Court evaluates (1) the character and the purpose of the institution benefitted,
(2) the nature of the aid provided by the government, and (3) the resulting
relationship between the government and religion.' 9'
Proposition 174 offers aid to religious elementary and secondary
schools."92 This part of the entanglement prong would have been the most
difficult hurdle to clear after Proposition 174 passed the primary effect test.
In the end, however, this one aspect would not have provided grounds to find
the initiative unconstitutional because, under the current view of state action
in the primary effects prong, there will be no action by the government to
"entangle" with religion. Proposition 174 would pass muster because the
parents choose to direct aid to religious schools instead of the government
giving financial support to the institution,"3 and, furthermore, the initiative
does not monitor the use of funds in private schools.
188. Id., subpart (a)(3).
189. For a similar analysis of the Bush voucher plan, America 2000, see Futterman, supra note 99,
at 727-28.
190. The entanglement prong of the Lemon test is what distinguished it from previous Establishment
Clause cases that looked both at purpose and primary effect of a law. The entanglement prong draws on
the principles set forth in Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674-80 (1970).
191. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)
192. Proposition 174 allows private religious schools to qualify as "scholarship-redeeming school"
as long as the school meets the basic requirements of the state to be a private school and meets the
additional minimal requirements set forth in the initiative. Proposition 174 supra note 35, subpart (b).
These additional requirements for "scholarship-redeeming schools" (1) prohibit schools from
discriminating on the basis or race, ethnicity, color, or national origin, (2) prohibit schools from
advocating unlawful behavior or teaching hatred of certain group or provides false information about he
school, and (3) prohibit schools from having less than 25 students. Id.
193. This distinction is false one. See infra notes 194-228 and accompanying text.
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III. PRIVATE CHOICE THEORY WEAKENS THE PROTECTIONS OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Proposition 174 was a state program designed to send state funds to
religious education despite parental involvement veiled in the language of
"choice." A private choice in a neutral program should not insulate a
program distributing state funds to religious education from constitutional
review under the Establishment Clause. This Part criticizes the Court's
formalistic analysis under Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest for several reasons.
Under the Court's analysis in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the directness
of aid factor proves decisive. 94 The law of the Establishment Clause,
however, should forbid a state from directly aiding religious education
because it is indistinguishable from aiding religion.'95 Despite the empha-
sis on parental "choice" in Proposition 174, the choice of the parent was
seriously circumscribed-so much so that it should not cut off the chain of
state action. Second, because Proposition 174 lacks meaningful choice, it is
indistinguishable from former programs found unconstitutional.
The possible constitutional analysis of Proposition 174 set forth in Part
II.B. reveals that the current private choice theory allows the state to aid
religious education under a general program to improve the quality of
education. Proposition 174 would have given to the state the power to aid
religious education with large grants of unrestricted state money through the
filter of parent choice. However, regardless of whether the state or parent
chooses the school, under Proposition 174 the state retains control and
possession of the funds and then releases them to the religious school.
Vouchers, as a lump-sum grant of state money, will provide support to the
entirety of religious schools, including religious teachers salaries, religious
school books, and prayer books. Such a program is and should be viewed
as state aid to religion.
The voucher program established by Proposition 174 should be found to
violate the Establishment Clause because the state contemplates and includes
religious schools within its incentives package, encouraging and knowing that
unrestricted state money will be used to support the entirety of the religious
school's mission and educational program. A parent's choice to deliver the
voucher to the religious school does not save the program. The attempt to
save a program delivering state funds to religious schools through the vehicle
of parental choice was prohibited by the Court in Nyquist.196 In Nyquist,
the Court focused on whether "grants delivered to parents rather than schools
is of such significance as to compel a contrary result [to that of direct
194. See supra notes 134-170 and accompanying text.
195. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, at 774-75 (1973)
(noting that aid to religious schools must have some way on insuring that the aid does not reach the
religious aspect of the schools).
196. Id. at 774-81.
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aid]. ""7 Looking at Everson and Allen, the Court in Nyquist concluded
that the fact that aid is given to parents rather than to schools, "far from
providing a per se immunity from examination of the substance of the States
program, . . . [is rather] only one of many factors to be considered."'198
Tuition grants in Nyquist were not subject to any restriction by the program
nor by the nature of the aid given to the school. Notwithstanding the private
choice made by parents, the Court concluded that the effect was "unmistak-
ably to provide desired financial support for non-public, sectarian institu-
tions. " 1 9 The same should be true for voucher programs that include
religious elementary and secondary schools, such as Proposition 174, because
even indirect aid runs aground of the Establishment Clause when there is no
effective way to guarantee that the aid is not used exclusively for secular,
neutral, and non-religious purposes.2
Parental choice might be a meaningful factor to limit state action, but a
severely limited choice, such as that in Propositions 174, cannot. For
example the donation of income from a federal paycheck to a church is a free
choice sufficient to cut off state action. In Witters, Justice Marshall
compared the results of the private choice to send the assistance grant to a
religious college to the choice by a federal employee to donate her paycheck
to a religious organization. 201  The Court concluded that there is no
Establishment Clause violation in the paycheck example, and consequently,
the private choice cuts off any action attributable to the state in the flow of
funds to the religious seminary. Voucher programs that include religious
schools are designed to aid education in a way that includes religious schools
within the scope of its incentive structure, and thus the legislature, in creating
such a program, directly foresees, intends, and allows state money to fund
religious education. Consequently, Proposition 174 differs from both the
blindness program and the federal paycheck.
The contrast with the federal paycheck example is illustrative. First and
most importantly, it is a question of state funds vs. personal funds. Whereas
the voucher is state money, the paycheck constitutes private money because
the paycheck pays for services rendered; the transaction is complete. When
a state program is designed to improve education and includes religious
education, it is not neutral. The use of the paycheck does not fulfill any
purpose of the program that gave the money to the employee in the first
place. Under Proposition 174, the state would have created a voucher so that
a parent could choose a voucher redeeming school, including religious
schools, and thereby improve the quality of education. Under the paycheck
scenario, the government did not create the employee's employment in order
to allow her to choose religious worship, rather it paid her for services
197. Id. at 780-81.
198. Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 780-83.
200. Id. at 780.
201. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986).
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rendered. The parent's choice is the means the state uses to achieve its end
of financing education. Thus, the transaction is not complete until the money
reaches the religious school. Second, state control of the funds indicates the
state action involved, the issue of who controls the use of funds distin-
guished the voucher from the paycheck. The employee has full control,
dominion, and possession over the paycheck. Under the voucher proposal,
parents never have dominion or possession over the money or scholarship,
the state retains control.2' Third, the state has no control over the use of
the paycheck (except that it may not be used illegal purposes). The voucher,
on the other hand, is restricted in its use. Even if the parent received the
scholarship, it may only be used for education at a voucher-redeeming
school. The parent may not buy groceries with it, pay her mortgage with it,
spend it at the race track, or donate ten percent to her church. The state has
control over the scope of the parent's choice in using the voucher and
explicitly allows the inclusion of religious education. Finally, the tax
consequences also differ. The federal paycheck is compensation for services
rendered, no strings attached, and the employee must also pay taxes on her
income. The voucher program is a creative state plan to finance education.
The drafters of Proposition 174 implicitly recognized this distinction by
having Proposition 174 explicitly note that the voucher does not represent
income to the parent.'0 3
These four distinctions reveal that the voucher is the state means to carry
out state goals with state funds that are restricted to one possible use and not
considered income to the parent. The differences also reveal that the voucher
does not resemble the freely given donation of a taxpayer's money to her
church or temple-rather, the state created the voucher as part of an
education finance system that includes religious schools. These distinctions
reveal that the "choice" of the parent is merely an uncertain delivery
mechanism to allow the state to deliver unrestricted state funds to religious
schools. Thus, the parent's "private" choice under Proposition 174 is, in
essence, only a question of to which type of school the state money will be
sent: and this "choice" is so restricted that it should not cut off state action
for purposes of Establishment Clause analysis.
The infirmity of technical timing and routing mechanisms to deliver state
funds to religious schools has been rejected in the past. The former,
conservative, Republican Governor of California George Deukmejian pointed
out the flimsy distinction between a voucher plan giving aid to religious
schools and tuition reimbursements to parents, which have been rejected as
unconstitutional direct aid to religious schools in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause. In an opinion analyzing the constitutionality of a voucher
program which included private religious schools, former state Attorney
General Deukmejian wrote:
202. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (b)(7).
203. Id., subpart (a)(4).
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There does not appear to be a constitutionally significant basis for distin-
guishing between a state program providing public funds to parents that
may be used to pay tuition in church-operated schools before the school
year commences (a state voucher program) and a state program providing
public funds to reimburse parents for tuition in church-operated schools
after the school year is completed (New York program overturned in
Nyquist).204
While Deukmejian wrote relying on Nyquist, his analysis highlights the
frivolous and insignificant timing difference between a voucher program and
what the Court struck down as direct aid to religious schools. Despite the
intermittent development of private choice doctrine in Mueller, Witters, and
Zobrest, the strength of the parallel to Nyquist is persuasive. When a state
program is designed to improve education and includes religious education,
it is not neutral. State restrictions on and possession of state funds overshad-
ow a parent's choice to send state funds to religious schools such that the
"private" choice is not independent of the greater state action. What
distinguishes the two is how and when the state sends state funds to
elementary and secondary religious schools, not whether the state sends state
funds to religious schools. Consequently, timing and routing distinctions of
the funds should have little constitutional significance to distinguish such a
program from direct aid.
The crafty language that the decision belongs to the parent and that the
decision of a parent "shall not constitute a decision or act of the State,""05
should not obscure the fact that the state directly disburses government funds
to religious institutions. 6 Blithely stating that the "sun is a planet" or
saying that "state aid to religion is constitutional because it is not an act of
the state" does not make either so. If accepted, this facile, tautological logic
would immunize any law from constitutional attack as long as it was properly
drafted. Under the Establishment Clause, it would allow the federal and
state governments to do what the Constitution through the First Amendment
plainly forbids by creating a general programs that in some small way
involve private individuals. Such a doctrine gives the power to legislatures
through the employment of ingenious lawyers, to subvert the command of the
Constitution that it is the supreme law of the land.
Neither history nor law supports the formalism of private choice theory.
At the creation of the Bill of Rights, the Founders rejected a form of the
204. 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 64 (Cal. 1981) (concluding that vouchers programs including religious
schools would violate the Establishment Clause). The opinion assumed that a vouchers program includes
religious and private schools as eligible redeeming voucher schools regardless of the moral, social values,
philosophy, or religion taught at the school. Id. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786-87 (concluding that the
timing of the reimbursement is of no constitutional significance).
205. Proposition 174, supra note 35, subpart (a)(4).
206. See supra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
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individual choice theory for the Establishment Clause.7' The Founders
rejected multiple establishments where religious assessments made by the
state for the benefit of religion directed by the individuals to the religion of
their choice."° Such individual choice did not relieve the coercive nature
of the assessment, nor did it alleviate the establishment through sponsorship.
In aid to religious education cases, the private choice of a parent to direct
state funds to a religious school should not relieve it of its character as state
aid to religion.
The Court's acceptance in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest of the private
choice reasoning obscures the fact that such reasoning is based on the theory
that a state may delegate a power the state does not have to another actor.
The private choice theory rests on the mistaken belief that the state may
delegate power to parents to act in place of the state and thereby avoid the
Establishment Clause challenge by removing the state actor. Other areas of
the law support the view that forbids federal and state governments from
delegating to private individuals a power that the state did not have to begin
with. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, °9 the court rejected a spousal
consent requirement before a woman could terminate her pregnancy during
the first trimester. By requiring spousal consent, the state attempted to
delegate to a husband the power to forbid a woman from choosing to
terminate her pregnancy. The state was prohibited from creating spousal
consent requirements because it could not delegate a power it was prohibited
from exercising. 0 Similarly, because the Establishment Clause forbids the
federal and state governments from directly giving state aid to religious
education, the state cannot delegate the same power to parents and students
to avoid a constitutional prohibition. Note that under Danforth, the
government is not prohibited from regulating abortion-it simply may not
give to another what it did not have power to do in the first place (prohibit
abortion in the first trimester). Accordingly, this view of state's power does
not invalidate all previous cases allowing aid to religious education under
limited circumstances. Rather, it merely eliminates the mistaken view, set
forth in private choice theory, that the state can avoid unconstitutional act by
delegating the choice to give state money to religious education to a non-state
actor, namely a parent. This is not to say that parents cannot give their own
money to religious education; it is a restriction on the use of government
funds.
There are several current popular views that a strong Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has been hostile to religion and should be cast aside to
207. See generally, James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 298 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). See also Sky, supra note 86, at 1465.
208. Douglas Laycock, "Non-Preferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 894-99, 913-19 (1986).
209. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
210. Id.
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allow greater accommodation to an inherently religious people. 211  Stephen
Carter criticizes the Court's view of religion as a "hobby" and is says it out
of step with the true beliefs of the American people.22  According to this
view, the Establishment Clause should accommodate aid to religious
institutions in order to prevent hostility towards religion. California's
Proposition 174 dovetailed with this view of the Establishment Clause.
Proponents of Proposition 174 (and voucher proponents in general) often
argue that the double burden of paying taxes to support the public school
system and additionally paying private religious school in tuition reveals the
hostility of Establishment Clause jurisprudence to religion.2 13  This view
of the Establishment Clause is based on a mistaken view about the impor-
tance of religious liberty. The Establishment Clause was not designed as a
weapon to marginalize religion. It captured the wisdom that not to separate
church and state endangers religious liberty. The Founders used the
"separation of church and state" to insure the protection of religious liberty
because religion was essential and of fundamental importance, not because
it was unimportant, irrational,2 4 or dangerous.2 5
It is not because religious teaching does not promote the public or
individual's welfare, but because neither is furthered when the state
promotes religion education, that the Constitution forbids it to do so. Both
legislatures and courts are bound by that distinction. In failure to observe
it lies the fallacy of the "public function"-"social legislation" argument
.... By no declaration that a gift of public money to religious uses will
promote the general or individual welfare, or the cause of education
generally, can legislative bodies overcome the Amendment's bar.... The
Amendment has removed this form of promoting the public welfare from
the legislative and judicial competence to make a public function. It is
exclusively a private affair.21 6
A glib interpretation of this idea could support the idea that by giving the
choice back to parents the state has left funding and choosing religious
education to private citizens. The fallacy of this argument is the same as the
one rejected in Danforth. The state has no original power to design a
211. CARTER, supra note 4, at 105-15. For current classifications of different Establishment Clausejurisprudence see Lupu, supra note 121, at 779-81 (describing the landscape of religion clause scholars
in categories of which clauses the authors favor to be strongly enforced). Writing for the Court in Zorach
v. Clauson, Justice Douglas approved of a release time program for students to leave school in order to
attend religious services, explaining, "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). Polls indicate that a large majority of the
population of the United States identifies itself as religious. Yet the conclusory remark by Justice Douglas
that our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being is more difficult to square with the fact the Constitution
does not use the word "God," rather the Constitution derives and presupposes the authority from "We,
the People," while, in contrast, the Declaration of Independence makes references many references to a
Divine Creator.
212. CARTER, supra note 4, at 23-43.
213. Id. at 200.
214. See id. at 106-15.
215. See Baer, supra note 18, at 449.
216. Everson v. Board of Edue., 330 U.S. 1, 52, 53 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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program which delegates to a private actor the choice to send state funding
to religious schools.
Proposition 174 would have allowed legislatures to achieve indirectly
what they cannot do directly by giving the power it did not constitutionally
have to a private actor. While some have used the principle of the separation
of church and state and its application to prohibit state funding of religious
schools as a reason to call religion a "wholly private affair, "1' 7 a more
accurate word for "private" is "non-governmental." The "wholly private
affair" language conjures up the notion that religion has no place in public
life. The Establishment Clause, however, allows for religion to play a role
in public life. In fact, the Free Exercise Clause demands that this is so. For
example, religious leaders may participate in our legislatures1 8 and
students may use public school facilities for voluntary religious meetings. 1 9
The state may even aid religious education at the college and university level
because of the age difference in students and the different educational mission
of these institutions that prevents the government from funding pervasively
sectarian institutions.2' Despite these accepted areas for accommodation,
the Court has repeatedly recognized that the state may not fund religious
education at the elementary and secondary level when there is no way to
ensure that the aid will not flow to the religious mission of the school.2"
Vouchers, as a lump-sum grant of money, will provide support to the
entirety of religious schools, including religious teachers salaries, religious
school books, and prayer books. This is precisely what the Establishment
Clause forbids.' Proposition 174 would have given to the state the power
to aid religious education with large grants of unrestricted money through the
filter of parent choice.
The principle here applies to religious elementary and secondary
education cases, and not to other areas under the Establishment Clause for
several reasons. As stated previously, the influence of religion dominates the
curricula of elementary and secondary schools established and run by
religious organizations which makes the secular and religious missions of the
school inextricably intertwined2 3 This influence, along with the young
age of school children, combine to form a unique environment different from
that of a religiously affiliated university. 4 This reason alone may be
adequate grounds to distinguish Witters from a voucher proposal such as
Proposition 174. The Court has recognized the significance of religious
217. Id. at 52.
218. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
219. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993)
220. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-87 (1971).
221. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774, 780 (1973)
222. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
223. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
224. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685-87.
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schools and distinguished this area of the law from other traditional excep-
tions where greater accommodation of religion is allowed, such as prayers
before state legislatures,' the deductibility of charitable contributions to
religious organizations,226 and equal access for religious clubs to public
schools after hours .' The unique nature of religious elementary and
secondary schools converts what might appear as an acceptable accommoda-
tion of religion in other contexts into a forbidden sponsorship of religion.
For this reason, the Court must remain vigilant against programs and
schemes allowing state aid to flow to these institutions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Private choice theory flounders in its attempt to save indirect aid to
religious education when it assumes that a state's action to give power to a
private individual to choose to send state funds to religious schools will evade
the Establishment Clause. This assumption is wrong because the choice is
not effective to cut off state action and because a state cannot delegate an
action it cannot take. The private choice under a neutral program theory
should not insulate from constitutional review under the Establishment Clause
a state program controlling, possessing, and distributing state funds to
religious education. Indirect aid, just as much as direct aid, runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause when there is no effective way to guarantee that the aid
is not used exclusively for secular, neutral, and non-religious purposes.
Voucher programs that include religious schools are designed to aid
education in a way that includes religious schools within the scope of its
incentive structure, and thus the legislature, in creating such a program,
directly foresees, intends, and allows state money to fund religious education.
Under Proposition 174, a parent would never have control nor possession of
the state funds; a parent would remain restricted in her disposal of the funds
to public or private schools (including religious schools); and a parent would
not take the voucher into her income. Such funds should be considered
within the scope of state action, despite parental involvement veiled in the
language of "choice," because the state delivers state funds to the religious
schools. Such programs are not neutral, and parental or student choice under
such programs are not private. Such should be the fate of any program
similar to Proposition 174.
The view that the separation of church and state represents hostility
towards religion is also based on the fallacy that the state has the power to
give parents control over sending state funds to religious schools in the first
place. The Establishment Clause removed that power from the federal
government 200 years ago and from the states almost fifty years ago through
225. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
226. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
227. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
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the extensions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Where the state has no
"power," it does not avoid violating the Constitution by giving that power
to another actor.
Although the future of Lemon test is uncertain, 9 current trends in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence under Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest have
weakened the protections for religious liberty against sponsorship, encroach-
ment, and control by government.2?0
In view of this possibility, religious institutions and private schools
should resist what initially appears to be a financial boon. These institutions
would be well advised to remember that the government's rule follows
shortly behind the government's coin.?'1 While Proposition 174 limited
possible, future regulation of private schools, a reformed voucher proposal
mighty create circumstances where federal or state regulations of religious
education would follow aid in order to satisfy the demand for public account-
ability and minimum standards for education. This prospect might be more
invasive and do far more damage to religious liberty than the initial impact
of religious sponsorship .232
Although the Supreme Court may currently remain unsympathetic to the
argument that parental choice does not immunize the state from the challenge
that it purposefully aids religious education because the state includes
religious schools among eligible voucher redeeming schools, other judges
hopefully will be sympathetic to the argument that a state cannot delegate a
power it does not have nor skirt the Establishment Clause by briefly
involving parents as a means to send state funds to religious schools.
228. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 104 (1947).
229. Before Justice White's retirement, there were five votes to abandon Lemon, but no majority
could agree on what test to adopt in its place. The recent decision to grant certiorari to Grumet v. Board
of Education, provided the Court with the opportunity to formally abandonLemon in favor of another test.
Grumet v. Board of Education, 618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993); Joan
Biskupic, School District Raises Church-State Question; Court to Review Hasidic Village Arrangement,
WASH. POST., Nov. 30, 1993, at A16.
230. Given that Justice Rehnquist does not even mention Lemon in Zobrest, the private choice
analysis of Mueller and its progeny may survive if the Court formally abandons Lemon.
231. Everson, 330 U.S. at 27-28 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, "it is hardly
a lack of due process for the government to regulate that which it subsidizes." Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942)). See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621 (1971) (noting that the history of
government grants of money reveals that they are almost always accompanied by control and surveillance).
232. On a more practical note, despite the assurance of Mayor Schundler that the Court will
unquestionably approve voucher program inclusive of religious schools, many organizations do not share
this view. Romano, supra note 1, at 1. Such organizations will remain vigilant and will oppose aid to
religious education. Legislators may be well advised to side-step what the Court may appear to allow to
save the litigation costs of defending suits based on Establishment Clause challenges to voucher program
funding religious education.
37
Bright: The Establishment Clause and School Vouchers: Private Choice and
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
CALrFORNmiA WESTERN LAW REVIEW[
Those judges may be swayed by the reasoning of Justice Douglas concurring
in Abington Township School District v. Schempp;23
The most effective way to establish any institution is to finance it; and this
truth is reflected in the appeals by church groups for public funds to
finance their religious schools. . . .What may not be done directly may
not have done indirectly lest the Establishment Clause becomes a mock-
ery.2M
233. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
234. Id. at 229-30 (emphasis in original omitted). See also Everson, 330 U.S. at 24 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) ("The prohibition against establishment of religion cannot be circumvented by a subsidy bonus
or reimbursement of expense to individuals for receiving religious instruction or indoctrination.").
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APPENDIX
PROPOSITION 174: TEXT OF PROPOSED LAW
This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with the
provisions of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
This initiative measure expressly amends the Constitution by adding a
section thereto; therefore, new provisions proposed to be added are printed
in italic type to indicate they are new.
PROPOSED LAW
THE PARENT CHOICE IN EDUCATION INITIATIVE
The following section, the "Parental Choice in Education Amendment"
is hereby added to Article IX of the California Constitution:
Section 17. Purpose. The people of California, desiring to improve the
quality of education available to all children, adopt this section to: (1) enable
parents to determine which schools best meet their children's needs; (2)
empower parents to send their children to such schools; (3) establish
academic accountability based on national standards; (4) reduce bureaucracy
so that more educational dollars reach the classroom; (5) provide greater
opportunities for teachers; and (6) mobilize the private sector to help
accommodate our burgeoning school-age population.
Therefore: All parents are hereby empowered to choose any school,
public or private, for the education of their children, as provided in this
section.
(a) Empowerment of Parents; Granting of Scholarships. The State shall
annually provide a scholarship to every resident school-age child. Scholar-
ships may be redeemed by the child's parent at any scholarship-redeeming
school.
(1) The scholarship value for each child shall be at least fifty percent
(50%) of the average amount of State and local government spending per
public school student for education in kindergarten and grades one though
twelve during the proceeding fiscal year, calculated on a statewide basis,
including every cost to the State, school districts, and county offices of
education of maintaining kindergarten and elementary and secondary
education, but excluding expenditures on scholarships granted pursuant to
this section and excluding any unfunded pension liability associated with the
public school system.
(2) Scholarship value shall be equal for every child in any given
grade. In case of student transfer, the scholarship shall be prorated. The
Legislature may award supplemental funds for reasonable transportation
needs for low-income children and special needs attributable to physical
impairment or learning disability. Nothing in this section shall prevent the
39
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use in any school of supplemental assistance from any source, public or
private.
(3) If the scholarship amount exceeds the charges imposed by a
scholarship-redeeming school for any year in which the student is in
attendance, the surplus shall become a credit held in trust by the State for the
student for later application toward charges at any scholarship redeeming
school or any institution of higher education in California, public or private,
which meets the requirements imposed on scholarship redeeming schools in
paragraphs (1) and (3) of subdivision (b) of this section. Any surplus
remaining on the student's twenty-sixth birthday shall revert to the state
treasury.
(4) Scholarship provided hereunder are grants of aid to children
through their parents and not to the schools in which the children are
enrolled. Such scholarships shall not constitute a decision or act of the State
or any of its subdivisions. No other provision of this Constitution shall
prevent the implementation of this section.
(5) Children enrolled in private schools on October 1, 1991, shall
receive scholarships, if otherwise eligible, beginning with the 1995-96fiscal
year. All other children shall receive scholarships beginning with the 1993-94
fiscal year.
(6) The State Board of Education may require each public school and
each scholarship-redeeming school to choose and administer tests reflecting
national standards for the purpose of measuring individual academic
improvement. Such tests shall be designed and scored by independent
parties. Each school's composite results for each grade level shall be
released to the public. Individual results shall be released only to the school
and the child's parent.
(7) Governing boards of school districts shall establish a mechanism
consistent with federal law to allocate enrollment capacity based primarily
on parental choice. Any public school which chooses not to redeem
scholarships shall, after district enrollment assignments based primarily on
parental choice are complete, open its remaining enrollment capacity to
children regardless of residence. For fiscal purposes, children shall be
deemed residents of the school district in which they are enrolled.
(8) No child shall receive any scholarship under this section or any
credit under paragraph (3) of this subdivision for any fiscal year in which the
child enrolls in a non-scholarship-redeeming school, unless the Legislature
provides otherwise.
(b) Empowerment of Schools; Redemption of Scholarships. A private
school may become a scholarship-redeeming school by filing with the State
Board of Education a statement indicating satisfaction of the legal require-
ments which applied to private schools on October 1, 1991, and the
requirements of this section.
(1) No school which discriminates on the basis of race, ethnicity, color
or national origin may redeem scholarships.
232 [Vol. 31
40
California Western Law Review, Vol. 31 [1994], No. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol31/iss2/2
1995] THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS 233
(2) To the extent permitted by this Constitution and the Constitution of
the United States, the State shall prevent from redeeming scholarships any
school which advocates unlawful behavior; teaches hatred of any person or
group on the basis of race, ethnicity, color, national origin, religion, or
gender; or deliberately provides false or misleading information respecting
the school.
(3) No school with fewer than 25 students may redeem scholarships,
unless the Legislature provides otherwise.
(4) Private schools, regardless of size, shall be accorded maximum
flexibility to educate their students and shall be free from unnecessary,
burdensome, or onerous regulation. No regulation of private schools,
scholarship-redeeming or not, beyond that requirement by this section and
that which applied to private schools on October 1, 1991, shall be issued or
enacted, unless approved by a three-fourths vote of the Legislature or,
alternatively, as to any regulation pertaining to health, safety, or land use
imposed by any county, city, district, or other subdivisions of the States, a
two-thirds vote of the governmental body issuing or enacting the regulation
and a majority vote of the qualified electors within the affected jurisdiction.
In any legal proceeding challenging such a regulation as inconsistent with the
section; the governmental body issuing or enacting it shall have the burden
of establishing that the regulation: (A) is essential to assure the health,
safety, or education of students, or, as to any land use regulation, that the
governmental body has a compelling interest in issuing or enacting it; (B)
does not unduly burden or impede private schools or the parents of students
therein; and (C) will not harass, injure, or suppress private schools.
(5) Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of this subdivision, the Legislature
may (A) enact civil and criminal penalties for schools and persons who
engage in fraudulent conduct in connection with the solicitation of students
or the redemption of scholarships, and (B) restrict or prohibit individuals
convicted of (i) any felony, (i) any offense involving lewd or lascivious
conduct, or (iii) any offense involving molestation or other abuse of a child,
from owning, contracting with, or being employed by any school, public or
private.
(6) Any school, public or private, may establish a code of conduct and
discipline and enforce it with sanctions, including dismissal. A student who
is deriving no substantial academic benefit or is responsible for serious or
habitual misconduct related to the school may be dismissed.
(7) After the parent designates the enrolling school, the State shall
disburse the student's scholarship funds, excepting funds held in trust
pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of this section, in equal amounts
monthly, directly to the school for credit to the parent's account. Monthly
disbursals shall occur within 30 days of receipt of the school's statement of
current enrollment.
(8) Expenditures for scholarships issued under this section and savings
resulting from the implementation of this section shall count toward the
minimum funding requirements for education established by Sections 8 and
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8.5 of Article XVL Students enrolled in scholarship-redeeming schools shall
not be counted toward enrollment in public schools and community colleges
for purposes of Sections 8 and 8.5 of Article XVI.
(c) Empowerment of Teachers; Conversion of Schools. Within one
year after the people adopt this section, the Legislature shall establish an
expeditious process by which public schools may become independent
scholarship-redeeming schools. Such schools shall be common schools under
this article, and Section 6 of this article shall not limit their formation.
(1) Except as otherwise required by this Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States, such schools shall operate under laws and
regulation no more restrictive than those applicable to private schools under
subdivision (b) of this section.
(2) Employees of such schools shall be permitted to continue and
transfer their pension and health care programs on the same terms as other
similarly situated participants employed by their school district so long as
they remain in the employ of any such school.
(d) Definitions.
(1) "Charges" include tuition and fees for books, supplies, and other
educational costs.
(2) A "child" is an individual eligible to attend kindergarten or grades
one through twelve in the public school system.
(3) A "parent" is any person having legal or effective custody of a
child.
(4) "Qualified electors" are persons registered to vote, whether or not
they vote in a particular election. The alternative requirement in paragraph
(4) of subdivision (b) or this section of approval by a majority vote of the
qualified electors within the affected jurisdiction shall be imposed only to the
extent permitted by this Constitution and the Constitution of the United
States.
(5) The Legislature may establish reasonable standardsfor determining
the "residency" of children.
(6) "Savings resulting from the implementation of this section" in eachfiscal year shall be the total amount disbursed for scholarships during that
fiscal year subtracted from the product of (A) the average enrollment in
scholarship-redeeming schools during that fiscal year multiplied by (B) the
average amount of State and local government spending per public school
student for education in kindergarten and grades one through twelve
calculated on a statewide basis, during that fiscal year.
(7) A "scholarship-redeeming school" is any school, public or private,
located within California, which meets the requirements of this section. No
school shall be compelled to become a scholarship-redeeming school. No
school which meets the requirements of this section shall be prevented from
becoming a scholarship-redeeming school.
(8) "State and local government spending" in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of this section includes, but is not limited to, spending fundedfrom all revenue sources, including the General Fund, federal funds, local
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property taxes, lottery funds, and local miscellaneous income such as
developer fees, but excluding bond proceeds and charitable donations.
Notwithstanding the inclusion offederalfunds in the calculation of "State and
local government spending, "federal funds shall constitute no part of any
scholarship provided under this section.
(9) A "student" is a child attending school.
(e) Implementation. The Legislature shall implement this section
through legislation consistent with the purposes and provisions of this section.
(9 Limitation of actions. Any action or proceeding contesting the
validity of (1) this section, (2) any provision of this section, or (3) the
adoption of this section, shall be commenced within six months from the date
of the election at which this section is approved; otherwise this section al all
of its provision shall be held valid, legal, and uncontestable. However, this
limitation shall not of itselfpreclude an action or proceeding to challenge the
application of this section or any of its provision to a particular person or
circumstance.
(g) Severability. If any provision in this section or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining
provisions or application shall remain in force. To this end the provisions
of this section are severable.
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